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Willingness to pay (WTP) estimates for novel products are needed to assess 
consumers’ valuation of these products as well as for product adoption and optimal 
pricing strategies. Using experiments in a retail setting, we compare hypothetical 
and non-hypothetical WTP values between a Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) 
auction mechanism and conjoint analysis. Our results suggest that the auction WTP 
values are higher than conjoint analysis WTP values. Moreover, the hypothetical 
WTP values are higher than the non-hypothetical WTP values in both elicitation 
mechanisms. 
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Introduction 
 
Every year thousands of new products are introduced into the marketplace with a 
low success rate.  Due to the high failure rate, accurate marketing research 
procedures are critical to increasing the chance for a successful product (Lusk, 
Feldkamp, and Schroeder, 2004).  Many of these novel products include new 
attributes or an innovative combination of preexisting attributes such as 
convenience, product form, new safety assurance levels, new technology or 
functional property.  For any new product, food and agribusiness companies need to 
know how consumers would value these products and decide on an introductory 
price that reflects consumers’ willingness to pay for the novel product.  Commonly, 
the price is assessed based on a “relative” close substitute that has similar 
attributes.  However, this strategy may not yield optimal pricing, since the initial 
price does not directly take into account how much consumers actually value the 
innovative product.   
 
The objective of our study is to assess and compare consumers’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) for novel products using two elicitation mechanisms: Becker-DeGroot-
Marshak mechanism (BDM) auction and conjoint analysis.  In addition, we also 
want to examine differences in WTP values from these two elicitation mechanisms 
using hypothetical and non-hypothetical experiments.  Hypothetical experiments 
are normally used when the actual product to be evaluated is not yet available.  A 
potential issue, however, that comes up when using hypothetical experiments is 
hypothetical bias in the WTP values.  Consequently, non-hypothetical or incentive 
compatible mechanisms have been recently introduced in the marketing field as an 
alternative to traditional hypothetical valuation.  Therefore, one of our goals is to 
specifically assess the sensitivity of experimental marketing results based on the 
following WTP elicitation mechanisms: hypothetical conjoint, hypothetical auction, 
incentive aligned/non-hypothetical conjoint and incentive compatible/non-
hypothetical BDM auction.  Food/agribusiness managers and researchers can use 
the results of our study to better understand how choice of WTP elicitation 
mechanisms can significantly influence WTP estimates, which can then be used to 
make informed product adoption and optimal pricing decisions. After discussion of 
the advantages/disadvantages of each technique, an illustrative example is given 






In an effort to determine potential profitability of selling new goods or modifying 
existing products, economists and market researchers are increasingly using 
experimental auctions as opposed to other experimental mechanisms (Depositario, 
Nayga, and Wu, 2007; Lusk et al., 2006; Shaw, Nayga, and Silva, 2006; Corrigan 
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and Rousu, 2006; Umberger and Feuz, 2004; Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002; 
Hoffman et al., 1993).  Experimental auction procedures have especially become a 
popular method for eliciting WTP values for new product attributes, and for 
examining several aspects of economic theory (Shogren et al., 1994; Melton, 
Huffman, and Shogren, 1996).  Hoffman et al. (1993) discusses in detail the 
advantages of including experimental auctions in a pretest market research 
program.  Particularly in the last two decades, auctions have been widely used to 
test economic theory in a lab setting and less frequently in a retail setting (see 
Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002).   
 
In experimental auctions, subjects are normally assigned to a specific group (also 
called treatment) or a control group.  The various treatments can be generated by 
using different types of subjects, settings, information, endowment levels, or 
elicitation mechanisms (e.g. Voelckner, 2006).  In an experimental auction, subjects 
submit a bid (otherwise referred to as the subject’s WTP) to get a product with the 
understanding that they may have to actually purchase the product at the 
conclusion of the study, and the market-clearing price is then determined.  One of 
the most popular elicitation mechanisms is the sealed-second-price auction, in 
which the highest bidder is the winner and has to pay the second highest price from 
the group of participants.  However, studies conducted in a retail environment 
typically entail a researcher asking a consumer a set of questions, which rules out 
the use of the sealed-second-price auction as an elicitation mechanism since there is 
no second highest bid.  Consequently, we used the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) 
mechanism.  For a review of some advantages and disadvantages of auction 
procedures, check Lusk and Hudson (2004). 
 
Commonly used experimental auction procedures are conducted in one of two ways: 
(i) subjects receive an endowed good (typically a pre-existing substitute) and then 
are asked to bid to exchange their endowed good for the good of interest, or (ii) 
subjects can bid directly on several competing goods and a random drawing can be 
used to determine which good is binding (must be purchased), so that demand for a 
single unit can be elicited.  Experiments involving a transaction of goods or cash are 
non-hypothetical.  In this study, we use the BDM mechanism to elicit our subjects’ 




Conjoint analysis has been widely applied to evaluate consumers’ willingness to pay 
for various products.  According to Green, Kreiger, and Wind (2001), conjoint 
analysis is “by far, the most used marketing research tool for analyzing consumer 
tradeoffs.”  This technique mimics a real buying decision by allowing subjects to 
choose between a set of product profiles with various combinations of predetermined 
attribute levels. By evaluating several products with various attribute 
combinations, it is possible to estimate the WTP for each attribute and its levels.  A 
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key benefit of conjoint designs is their ease of use.  However, conjoint designs have 
typically been hypothetical (i.e., no transaction takes place), in nature.  Based on 
prior research, subjects facing a hypothetical buying decision tend to behave 
differently than subjects in a real buying situation, leading to biased WTP 
estimates. 
 
Recently, some modified versions of conjoint analysis have been developed that 
maintain ease of use, while reducing hypothetical bias.  Ding (2005) and Voelckner 
(2006) have published applications of incentive aligned conjoint analysis.  This 
technique takes advantage of the incentive compatibility of experimental auctions 
and the availability of substitutes in conjoint analysis.  In other words, conjoint 
designs are transformed from hypothetical transactions to “real life” transactions 
where the respondent may have to purchase a product that they are evaluating.  By 
including the incentive modification to traditional conjoint analysis, the decision-
making environment becomes even more realistic, while maintaining the ease of 
application that managers and researchers desire when conducting an experiment 
in a retail setting.  Consequently, subjects may generate more accurate information 
and allow for improved applicability for agribusiness decision-making. However, 
introduction of a transaction into the experiment does come at a cost since the 
product chosen for purchase must be provided, which may cause problems if the 
product is only in the developmental or prototype stages.  To our knowledge, prior 
work utilizing the incentive aligned conjoint approach has not been evaluated 




After conducting the study either through the auction or conjoint analysis format, 
calculation and comparison of WTP estimates is the next critical step.  Calculation 
of the WTP of a product, for both the hypothetical and non-hypothetical auction 
experiments, usually involve running a regression to test the significance of both 
treatment effects and other explanatory variables, such as demographics.  With 
regards to hypothetical and non-hypothetical conjoint analysis, when a rating scale 
is used, the ratings are regressed on the product profiles to obtain part worth 
estimates.  Next, a transformation is needed to move from utility space to a 
monetary price space.  Voelckner’s (2006) transformation utilizes a limit-card to 
make the conversion from utility to price and is briefly described below.  First, the 
part-worths are estimated for each attribute level for each respondent using 
ordinary least squares.  Second the utility is calculated for each product using all 
part-worths except those associated with price.  Third, the utility for those products 
the respondent is willing to buy and the minimum or limit utility are calculated.  
Fourth, the price that equates the limit utility with the utility value in step two is 
then the monetary WTP.   
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After obtaining all the WTP for every treatment, a random effects single limit 
(censored at 0) tobit model was used to assess both attribute and treatment effects 
on WTP.  A random effects tobit model was used due to the panel like structure of 




We conducted a field experiment, utilizing both conjoint analysis and auction 
mechanisms, at selected grocery stores in College Station, Texas in February 2007. 
Adult shoppers (at least 18 years old) were intercepted while exiting the store and 
asked to participate in the study.  The study was designed to last no longer than ten 
minutes to reduce respondent fatigue.  Using grapefruit as the product of interest, 
our subjects completed both a demographic and consumption questionnaire about 
their fresh fruit purchasing.  We used value-added products with attributes 
consisting of type of cut (segmented or cubed) and preservatives (with or without) in 
our WTP experiments. The attributes of interest (i.e., segment/cube and 
with/without preservatives) were identified during our pre-tests as the most 
important attributes that consumers consider in purchasing value-added grapefruit 
products. In addition to these attributes, the conjoint experiments also involved a 
price attribute ($0.5, $2.50, or $4.00 per half-pound).  These price levels were also 
obtained from the pretest results of the survey.  Our auction experiments did not 
have a specified price since respondents were required to give their own WTP.  A 
total of 245 subjects participated in our experiments
2 which involved four 
treatments: hypothetical conjoint, incentive aligned/non-hypothetical conjoint, 
hypothetical auction, or incentive compatible/non-hypothetical BDM auction (see 
Table 1).    
 
Table 1: Experimental Treatment Groups 
Group  Subject Task  Sample Size 
A-Nonhypothetical Auction   Write down WTP; product to purchase was 
randomly chosen. 
44 
B-Hypothetical Auction  Write down WTP on rating scale; no transaction 
occurred. 
64 
C-Nonhypothetical Conjoint  Rate pictures; Product to purchase was randomly 
chosen. 
59 
D-Hypothetical Conjoint  Rank pictures; no transaction occurred.  78 
 
 
Subjects in the hypothetical conjoint treatment were asked to evaluate twelve 
pictures consisting of various combinations of product attributes and rate their 
intention to buy on a 1 to 7 scale.  A transformation given by Voelckner (2006), 
discussed in the model section of this paper, was used to transform the rating scale 
values to monetary WTP estimates.   
 
 
2 The study script and questionnaires are available from the authors upon request.   
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In the hypothetical auction treatment, subjects were free to write down any number 
to express their WTP.  Participants were explicitly told that they could assess a 
WTP of zero dollars if they did not want the product.  The products were presented 
in a set of four pictures and every picture was titled with the attributes they 
represented.  Since price was not given, as was the case with conjoint, only four 
pictures were needed, representing all combinations of the attributes presented 
above.  Considering that this treatment was hypothetical, no transactions took 
place.   
 
The only difference between the hypothetical and non-hypothetical treatments was 
that the respondents had the chance of purchasing one of the products in the non-
hypothetical treatments.  In the non-hypothetical auction treatment, a random 
product and price (i.e. market price) was chosen after giving their WTP for each 
picture. The subject had to purchase the randomly selected product if their stated 
price was equal to or higher than the market price.  In the non-hypothetical conjoint 
treatment, a product was randomly chosen and the respondent had to purchase the 
product only if their rating was four or greater.  If their rating was less than four 
then another product was randomly drawn.  This procedure continued until a 
transaction occurred or three products had been drawn randomly.  Up to three 
products were chosen so as to maintain the same chance of “winning” as the non-
hypothetical BDM auction, given that the subject had a favorable rating for the 
product.  Based on the incentive aligned literature, this can be thought of as a 
modified version of the work done by Ding (2005) and Voelckner (2006).   
Our subjects each received $4 for participating in our experiments. This 
participation fee may be considered as an endowment that could be spent totally or 
partially in the study.  If a subject purchased a product, then they received the 
product plus the $4 minus the price paid for the product.  The giving of endowments 
may bias WTP estimates for the good in question (Harrison, 1989), which is called 
an endowment effect. Loureiro, Umberger, and Hine (2003) design an experiment to 
test if three levels of monetary endowments would cause significant different bids.  
The authors conclude that an endowment close to the value of the auctioned good 
should not have a significant impact in the experimental design.  Consequently, 
since the four dollars was close to the expected WTP values based on a pretest of the 
survey, we do not expect a significant endowment effect in the WTP estimates.   
 
Results and Discussion  
 
The first step in the analysis was to calculate the WTP values for each treatment 
using the simple averages (see Table 2).  Results show that the auction WTP means 
are higher than the conjoint WTP means, in both the hypothetical and non-
hypothetical experiments.  Also, in both auction and conjoint treatments, the 
hypothetical WTP mean is higher than the respective non-hypothetical treatment 
mean. 
 
© 2007 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  170Silva, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007 











$1.50 C $1.35 B,D $1.59 B,C,D $1.32 B
B-Hypothetical 
Auction 
$1.83 D,C $1.56 A,C,D $1.87 A,C,D $1.67 A,C,D
C-Nonhypothetical 
Conjoint 
$1.40 A,B $0.73 B $1.54 A,B,D $0.84 B,D
D-Hypothetical 
Conjoint 
$1.53 B $0.79 A,B $1.99 A,B,C $1.18B,C
(*) The simple averages represent the average WTP for that product. 
Note: Significance is tested pair-wise using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For example, a superscript of BD in 
Nonhypothetical auction means that Treatment A (non-hypothetical auction) is significantly different from 
treatments B (hypothetical auction) and D (hypothetical conjoint).  
 
 
Table 3 formally shows the differences between the hypothetical and non-
hypothetical BDM auction and the hypothetical and non-hypothetical conjoint.  
Statistical tests of the differences between treatments were calculated using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions since normality of 
the WTP distributions was rejected.   Results generally indicate that, with the 
exception of two cases, the hypothetical WTP values are significantly higher than 
the non-hypothetical WTP values. 
 
















$0.13 $0.06 $0.45*  $0.34* 
(*)   Statistically significant at the 0.10 level using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
(**) This difference has a p-value of 0.154 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of all the variables in the model are presented in Table 4.  
The mean WTP results suggest that our subjects value segmented products without 
preservatives the most with average WTP of $1.78, followed by cubed products 
without preservatives, segmented products with preservatives, and then cubed 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
  Median   Mean  Std. Dev.   Max  N.  Min 
Willingness to Pay 
Cubes with preservatives  1.00  1.08  0.94  5.00  223  0 
Cubes without preservatives  1.50  1.58  1.09  4.42  223  0 
Segment with preservatives  1.08  1.25  1.03  5.67  223  0 
Segments without preservatives  1.50  1.78  1.19  5.00  223  0 
Treatment Indicators             
Treatment A (non-hypothetical auction)  0  0.18  0.39  1  223  0 
Treatment B (hypothetical auction)  0  0.26  0.44  1  223  0 
Treatment C (non-hypothetical conjoint)  0  0.22  0.42  1  223  0 
Treatment D (hypothetical conjoint)  0  0.33  0.47  1  223  0 
Income Indicators             
$19,000 or less  0  0.43  0.50  1  223  0 
$20,000 - $39,999  0  0.22  0.42  1  223  0 
$40,000 - $59,000  0  0.11  0.32  1  223  0 
$60,000 - $79,999  0  0.08  0.27  1  223  0 
$80,000 - $99,999  0  0.06  0.24  1  223  0 
More than $100,000  0  0.09  0.29  1  223  0 
Marital Status Indicators             
Single 1  0.51  0.50  1  223  0 
Married 0  0.46  0.50  1  223  0 
Other (widows and divorced)  0  0.04  0.19  1  223  0 
Educational Indicators             
Less than 12 years  0  0.04  0.21  1  223  0 
12 years (graduated from high school)  0  0.21  0.41  1  223  0 
More than 12 and less than 16 years  0  0.29  0.46  1  223  0 
16 years (graduated from college)  0  0.30  0.46  1  223  0 
More than 16 years  0  0.16  0. 37  1  223  0 
Situational Indicator             
Hungry and thirsty  0  0.28  0.45  1  223  0 
 
 
To definitively assess the product and treatment effects on WTP, we ran a single 
limit random effects tobit model. The marginal effects and standard errors of the To 
definitively assess the product and treatment effects on WTP, we ran a single limit 
random effects tobit model.  The marginal effects and standard errors of the random 
effects Tobit model are exhibited in Table 5, see Appendix.  All the product and 
treatment effects are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Specifically, 
consistent with the descriptive WTP means, our model results indicate that 
segmented products without preservatives are valued about $0.83 more than cubed 
products with preservatives (base product), ceteris paribus. Cubed products without 
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preservatives and segmented products with preservatives are valued about $0.61 
and $0.23 more than cubed products with preservatives.  In terms of the 
treatments, consistent with the descriptive analysis, results suggest that the 
auction treatments have generally higher estimates than the conjoint WTP values.  
Specifically, the results show that the non-hypothetical BDM auction ($0.43), the 
hypothetical auction ($0.76) and hypothetical conjoint ($0.37) treatments have 
significantly higher WTP values than the non-hypothetical conjoint
3. The non-
hypothetical conjoint treatment has the lowest WTP values while the hypothetical 
auction treatment has the highest WTP values.  Also, as evidence of the expected 
existence of hypothetical bias in hypothetical valuation experiments, the 
hypothetical treatments have significantly higher WTP values than the non-
hypothetical treatments.  Specifically, the marginal effects suggest that the WTP 
values in hypothetical auction are $0.33 higher than the non-hypothetical BDM 
auction and the WTP values from the hypothetical conjoint are $0.37 higher than 
the non-hypothetical conjoint.  In summary, we find that the non-hypothetical 
valuation mechanisms offered a significant reduction of the possible hypothetical 
bias.  This finding is consistent with the findings of Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 
(2004).  Using a sample of 104 subjects in a lab setting, they found that WTP for 
hypothetical treatments was 1.2 times the size of the non-hypothetical treatments. 
In contrast, Voelckner (2006) could not definitively find a significant reduction in 
hypothetical bias with the use of incentive aligned mechanisms.  A key difference 
between our study and the Voelckner (2006) and Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 
(2004) studies is that their studies were conducted in a lab setting as opposed to a 
retail/field environment. 
 
In terms of the other variables, marital status, education level and a situational 
variable (hungriness and thirstiness at the time of the experiments) are statistically 
significant.  Specifically, single and married subjects have higher WTP values than 
other individuals (i.e., widows and divorced).  As expected, subjects who indicated 
that they felt hungry and thirsty during the experiments have higher WTP values 
($0.36 more) than those who were not hungry/thirsty.  Ethnicity, household age 
composition, principal shopper condition, purchase location, frequency of purchasing 
and complexity of the task were originally included in the model but were excluded 
in the final model because they were not close to being statistically significant.  
Similarly, with respect to experimental design, we also did not find any significant 
store, time of the day, day of the week and interviewer effects. 
To better understand the complexity of the treatment for each subject, a question 
was included asking each respondent to rate the degree of complication of the 
                                                           
3 In addition, we compared groups A and C (non-hypothetical treatments) and B and D (hypothetical treatments).  
We found that the non-hypothetical conjoint was a significant $ 0.46 less than the non-hypothetical auction.  Using 
the same procedure for the hypothetical groups, we found that hypothetical conjoint estimation was a significant $ 
0.47 less than the hypothetical auction estimation.   We do not include these outputs in the paper but are available 
from the authors upon request.   
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experiments (Table 6).  As expected the hypothetical groups have a lower 
complexity index than the non-hypothetical groups.  The hypothetical groups 
required little training to complete their task while the non-hypothetical groups 
required more respondent effort to understand the experimental and survey 
process.  Further analysis reveals that the hypothetical conjoint (most popular 
approach) had the lowest complexity score, while the non-hypothetical or incentive 
aligned conjoint had the highest.  In addition, the random effects model shows that 
the complexity variable was not significant. Considering the level of complexity 
expressed by the subjects overall and since it is not statistically significant, we do 
not believe that the complexity of the treatments played a significant role in their 
WTP estimates or can explain some of the WTP variation. 
 
Table 6: Level of Complexity of the Task 
Group Complexity  Level 
A-Nonhypothetical Auction   2.83 
B-Hypothetical Auction  2.51 
C-Nonhypothetical Conjoint  3.04 
D-Hypothetical Conjoint  2.31 
       Note: The subject classifies the task from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very hard) 
 
 
Concluding Remarks and Managerial Implications 
 
Food and agribusiness managers continue to introduce novel products into the 
marketplace in the hope of increasing revenues, market share, and satisfy changing 
consumer and market needs.  However, developing and introducing new products 
into the market can be expensive.  In addition, thousands of new food products are 
introduced into the market every year with very low success rates.  Thus, assessing 
consumers’ valuation of these new products is critical.  Secondary data are normally 
not available for new products.  Hence, researchers need to use hypothetical or 
experimental markets to evaluate the market potential of novel products (Lusk and 
Hudson, 2004). 
 
Over the last three decades, market researchers have been using conjoint analysis 
to measure consumer preferences and determine WTP.  In addition, experimental 
economics have introduced some incentive compatible auctions to test economic 
theory and measure WTP.  More recently, incentive aligned studies, taking 
advantage of both auction and conjoint analysis formats, have been proposed as the 
next step to measure WTP.  We have reviewed the incentive aligned mechanism in 
an auction and conjoint analysis context.  Using experiments in a retail setting, our 
results generally suggest that indeed, consumers’ WTP values are influenced by the 
type of valuation or elicitation mechanism and by the hypothetical/non-hypothetical 
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nature of the valuation process.  Interestingly, our findings suggest that auction 
WTP values are higher than conjoint analysis WTP.  This result does not 
necessarily mean that one should be preferred over the other.  On the contrary, the 
choice of a particular type of elicitation mechanism should be based, among others, 
on the objective and nature of the study.  We also recommend that market 
researchers view these elicitation mechanisms as complementary to each other 
rather than substitutes.  For example, experiences and values from a conjoint 
analysis study can be used to better design auction experiments and vice-versa.  
From our experiments, we also generally found that the hypothetical WTP values 
are higher than the non-hypothetical WTP values in both elicitation mechanisms.  
This result is expected due to the possible occurrence of hypothetical bias in 
hypothetical valuation studies. Evidence of this hypothetical bias in some 
contingent valuation studies is widespread (Cummings, Harrison and Rutstrom 
1995; List and Gallet 2001; Loomis et al. 1997; Neill et al. 1994). Based on these 
results, our recommendation is for future valuation efforts to use nonhypothetical 
rather than hypothetical elicitation mechanisms especially when the new product of 
interest can be produced and available.   
 
In conclusion, our results imply that the decision a researcher or manager makes 
with respect to the elicitation mechanism and their implementation can have a 
direct impact on estimates of the value of novel products.  Since agribusinesses are 
continuously finding new ways of fulfilling a more demand and consumer-driven 
marketplace, this finding is of utmost importance due to cost of developing and 
launching novel products.  Having appropriate estimates of consumers’ valuation of 
these novel products can aid business managers decide which of these products 
should be adopted, market tested, or commercialized.  It will also guide them in 
making optimal pricing decisions. 
 
Future studies should attempt to design elicitation mechanisms that can provide 
consumer surplus and price elasticity of demand measures that can further aid 
business and managerial decision-making.  For example, Corrigan (2006) and 
Depositario, Nayga, and Wu (2007) have examined the use of “reverse auction” 
mechanism.  They argue that the reverse auction mechanism provides information 
that could enable the estimation of consumer surplus and price elasticities of 
demand.  They also found that the reverse auction mechanism produces little bid 
affiliation and round effects in repeated auctions.  Another promising tool that 
market researchers and managers can potentially use are virtual experiments (VE) 
(Nayga 2007).  As Fiore et al. (2007) discussed, VE can bridge the gap between the 
controls of lab experiments and the naturalistic domain of field experiments, which 
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Table 5: Marginal Effects and Standard Errors of the Random Effects Tobit Model 
   4-Treatment Data Set 
Groups     A, B,C,D 
Sample Size     892 
      Coefficient 
   Intercept  -0.85* 
      (0.44) 
Product Indicators      
   Cubes with preservatives  Base 
  Cubes without preservatives  0.61* 
   (0.08) 
  Segment with preservatives  0.23* 
   (0.08) 
  Segments without preservatives  0.83* 
      (0.08) 
Treatment Indicators     
   Treatment A (nonhypthetical auction)  Base 
  Treatment B (hypothetical auction)  0.43* 
   (0.20) 
  Treatment C (nonhypothetical conjoint)  0.76* 
   (0.18) 
  Treatment D (hypothetical conjoint)  0.37* 
      (0.17) 
Income Indicators      
   $19,000 or less  0.39 
   (0.27) 
 $20,000-$39,999  0.18 
   (0.26) 
 $40,000-$59,000  0.08 
   (0.29) 
 $60,000-$79,999  0.63* 
   (0.32) 
 $80,000-$99,999  -0.04 
   (0.33) 
   More than $100,000  Base 
Marital Status Indicators        
   Single  0.84* 
   (0.35) 
 Married  0.90* 
   (0.36) 
 Other  (widow/divorced)  Base 
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Table 5: (Continued)     
Educational Indicators      
   Less than 12 years  -0.50 
   (0.35) 
  12 years (graduated from high school)  0.31 
   (0.21) 
  More than 12 and less than 16 years  0.16 
   (0.21) 
  16 years (graduated from college)  0.22 
   (0.19) 
  More than 16 years  Base 
        
Situational Indicator     
   Hungry and Thirsty  0.36* 
   (0.14) 
   Sigma_u  0.81* 
   (0.05) 
 Sigma_e  0.82* 
   (0.02) 
 Rho  0.49 
      (0.04) 
(*) Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
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